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Statement of the Case
Marti Mortensen adopts and incorporates by reference Whites' appeal brief,
which includes the following:
This case is an easement dispute. The basic layout of the properties involved
in the case is seen in Trial Exhibit 6, a survey map produced In July, 2002.
Mortensen acquired his property in 1994 from Peplinski (Trial Exhibit D-20) and
previously owned by Millsaps. White's properly was acquired from Mortensen In
2001 and 2002 (Trial Exhibits D-21 and 0-22), part of the 160 acres that
Mortensen obtained from Peplinksi.
The access road has been in the same location on Akers' property since as
early as 1958. (Trial Exhibits 3 and J-1), seen clearly in 1965 aerial photographs.
(Trial Exhibit K-I) Akers in 1982 altered the approach to the Access Road as it
left the County road (Tr., Vol. I, p. 662, II 34), altering the travel portion of the
easement that was being used by Peplinski. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 661-62, II.
18-25,11.1-5). After Akers put in the curved approach Peplinski rebuilt the portion
of the Access Road that tied into the new curved approach over the course of two
or three days using fill material that he cut from the embankment on the south side
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of the Access Road and adjusted the position of the Access Road in Section 24 so
that it curved slightly south onto his property. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 812-13, II. 13-25,
1-20) Peplinski continued to use the curved path approach of the Access Road to
access his property until It was sold to Mortensen in 1994, as did Mortensen
without opposition from Akers. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 251-52, II. 19-25 1-7). After
Mortensen sold the property to White, Akers began blocking Appellants access to
their respective properties and filed this suit.
On May 8, 2002, the district court entered a temporary restraining order,
restraining Akers from blocking access to Appellants' property, but also prohibited
Appellants' use of the curved approach to reach the Access Road. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.
78). This order precipitated construction of the 12.2 foot approach but that was
not the original route traveled to use the Access Road.(Tr., Vol. I, p. 330, II.
147-19). In light of the district court's order, Mortensen and White began making
Improvements to the area south of the curved approach, (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 264-65,
II. 10-25,1-21) so that Appellants could get to the Access Road from the County
Road. (Trial Exhibit 769) The trial exhibits establish the Access Road's route as it
left Government Lot 2 and crossed into Section 24. Trial Exhibits D42, D43 and
-2-

D-44, depicted the access road as It left the County Road, and made a wide curve
into Section 19 before it turned Into Appellants' property. (Trial Exhibits D-42,
D-43, and D44, E).
In January 2002, White began excavating on his property, changing grade to
create a new access point. (Tr., Vol 1, p. 937-38, U. 3-25,1-2; Trial Exhibit 6) It is
in this location that Judge Mitchell decided the Access Road crossed into Whites'
property via a prescriptive easement.
On 1st remand Judge Mitchell ruled that the access road crossed into
SECTION 24 into Akers land but immediately turned 90 degrees leaving
Mortensens and Whites with a nonfunctional easement. On the 2nd appeal
Mortensens and Whites were granted a new trial and jUdge. However that opinion
was retracted and replaced with a substitute opinion months later. In the substitute
opinion this Court determined that the prescriptive easement for the entire
roadway was only 12.2. However the photographic and testimonial evidence is
dubious. (White brief p. 21-22) The trial court declined to permit new evidence
that would have shown the exact width and location of the easement with great
specificity. (White brief p. 23)
-3-

Argument

Note - Appellant refers to some documents that will be the subject of a
motion to Augment the Record with some older documents not included in the
original Transcript for this appeal.
1. Matters Incorporated by Reference

Respondents argue theat Marti Mortensen makes no argument about
location of the easement, because we incorporated Vernon Mortensen's argument,
and his argument was too poorly briefed to be considered. That issue is, we
understand, as yet not fully resolved.
First, we incorporated the arguments of Vernon Mortensen and White
Construction. Second, Vernon Mortensen's arguments, while perhaps not artfully
couched, are nonetheless cogent and are set out below.
2. Punitive Damages

Judge Mitchell's damages against Mortensens and Whites today, now that
they have an easement, remain the same as 8 years ago when the court ruled
Mortensens and Whites were land-locked. The court's reasoning was that since
-4-

Mortensens and Whites knew they had no easement but still used the access road
their trespass was wanton, Malicious and with trickery. His award, totaling
$346,542.00 was based on his erroneous determination that the access road never
crossed into section 24. Instead it turned south entered Reynolds' property and
climbed a cliff before entering the 160. Almost half of the entire sum of damages
against Mortensens and Whites are punitive damages against Mortensens.

Judge

Mitchell based all damages on three premises; that Mortensen was involved in
other easement litigations, not supported by the record; that the access road was
only 12.2 feet wide based on a survey in 2002 not of a road but of a travel path of
a road and that Dennis Akers granted Mortensens permission to use the road when
Vernon Mortensen supposedly met with Dennis Akers the day before Mortensens
purchased the Peplinski 160 acres, also unsupported.
The primary purpose for punitive damages is deterrence of similar conduct.

Linscott v. Rainier National Life Insurance Co., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958
(1980). We all agree that punitive damages may be awarded where there is "an
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was
performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its likely
-5-

consequences." Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d
661,669 (1983). The issue focuses, however, on whether Mortensen's state of
mind was "extremely harmful." R. T. Nahas v. Hulet, 114 Idaho 23, 752 P.2d 625
(et. App. 1988). Where, as in that case, the scope of the easement is lawfully

undefined, the extreme harmfulness cannot be readily established.
A. Mortensen's Recidivism
Judge Mitchell found "This is not the first time Mortensen has bought
property low, sold quickly for a marked increase, then found himself in litigation
because of lack of access to that property". (Tr. P. 570 at 596). In fact Judge
Mitchell states this is the "primary reason the punitive damage awards are in
different amounts as between Mortensens and Whites." [Tr. P. 570 at 589] But
Appellant believes there is no evidence in the record to show such prior "other
litigation." It is impossible to prove a negative, but Appellants have consistently
asked the trial court to articulate what previous litigation is referenced, and
Appellants believe there are no such.
Judge Mitchell stated:
This is not the first time Mortensen has bought property low, sold quickly
-6-

for a marked increase, then found himself in litigation because of lack of
access to that property". (Tr. P. 570, at 596)
Judge Mitchell has reaffirmed this decision throughout the life of this ten year
litigation whereupon he assessed huge punitive damages against Mortensens:
This Court has assessed Mortensen differently as a recidivist due to his
conduct in other situations and other litigations. All of which result in
differing amounts of punitive damage awards. [Tr. P. 570 at 593]
There is certainly proof that Mortensens were very consistent in their
intimidation in this case and in other cases prior to and during this litigation.
That is the primary reason the punitive damage awards are in different
amounts as between Mortensens and Whites." [Id. Page 589, starting at line
37]
And, at least as to Mortensens, that "repetitive antisocial conduct" has
occurred in other litigation ..... [Id. P. 590, starting at line 26]
Campbell states" ... that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a
first offender [because] repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an
individual instance of malfeasance ... " [Id. page 592, starting at line 44 ]
Thus, this is not Vernon Mortensen's first time to enter the litigation
rodeo ....... " [Id. At 600, starting atline 39]
For Vernon Mortensen to now argue: "I am demanding Susan Weeks
provide the case numbers [of this prior litigation]" entirely misses the point.
It is not plaintiffs' burden to now prove the truth of what Vernon Mortensen
failed to rebut at trial." [Id. Page 602, lines 3-5]
However, no one testified to Mortensens' prior access litigations and exhibits were
-7-

never entered into evidence. Mortensen couldn't rebut non- existing testimony or
exhibits. That finding is unsupported.
Judge Mitchell also repetitively found Mortensens "harmed innocent
purchasers" but does not name a single "harmed innocent purchaser" nor can the
name of one be found in the trial record; not a single harmed innocent purchaser
testify in court. There are no harmed purchasers. The trial court has no substantial
and competent evidence to support that claim.
One who is unfamiliar with this case could read the many misrepresented
facts and believe the trial was about Mortensens selling land to Akers and then not
providing access and thus harming them while in truth Akers sued Mortensens and
White in an effort to take away their legal access which they did until this case
was appealed to the Supreme Court.
B. Prescriptive Easement
Judge Mitchell made a finding that Mr. Mortensen left a card with Akers
indicating he was going to buy the Peplinski property. [Findings ~4 p. 20]
However Mr. Akers testified that he did not know Mortensen had bought the
Peplinski property until 6 months later. [Trial Transcript p. 991 lines 13-22, 993
-8-

lines 18-25] Judge Mitchell's finding that Mr. Mortensen's use of the easement
was occasional was contradicted by Mr. Akers's testimony. [Trial Transcript p.
627 lines 10-25]
Judge Mitchell has based his findings on a single false premise that when
Mortensens bought 160 acres from Peplinski there was no legal access. That is
what Judge Mitchell initially wrongfully determined eight years ago. However
with the aid of the Supreme Court it has been determined that there never was an
access problem. Judge Mitchell continues to base huge punitive damages against
Mortensens as if his initial and erroneous opinion of lack of easement was correct.
Judge Mitchell found "credible the testimony of Dennis Akers that Mr.
Mortensen left a card in Akers' door wanting Akers to call, that Mortensen was
going to buy the land from Peplinskis the next day, that Akers then gave
Mortensen permission." (FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER, Filed 1-2-03, paragraph # 4, page 20) But Dennis Akers' own testimony
establishes that six months after Mortensens purchased in September 1994 he still
didn't know Mortensens had purchased the 160 acres.
Reagan:

Okay. So as of the date of this deposition, March 6, 1995,
-9-

before this matter is resolved you know that the Peplinskis
have already sold the property?
I didn't know that. I was told. I hadn't been shown nothing.
Akers:
Reagan:
If you didn't know why did you answer in the affirmative?
They told me that they'd sold it, but I hadn't seen nothing.
Akers:
Okay. Did you have any reason to dispute that the property had
Reagan:
been sold from the Peplinskis to Mr. Mortensen?
Didn't know.
Akers:
You didn't know who bought the property?
Reagan:
No. They never said nobody's name or anything. All they said
Akers:
was that it could've been sold.
(Trial Transcript, page 991, lines 13-22)
Okay. Isn't it true that you knew that Mr. Mortensen had
Reagan:
purchased the property at the time your deposition is taken on
March 6, 1995?
Akers:
Does it have his name in here somewhere?
'Yes" or "no", Mr. Akers.
Reagan:
I don't know because at my deposition I never was told
Akers:
anybody's name or anything that I can remember.
(Trial Transcript, page 993, lines 18-25)
Judge Mitchell made a critical mistake when concluding Dennis Akers gave
Mortensens permission to use the east curved portion of the road or any part of the
road the day before Mortensens purchased the Peplinski property. Mortensens
used the access road for seven years after purchasing from Peplinski and prior to
Akers filing suit and falsely alleging Mortensens could only access their property
with Akers permission now withdrawn. During those seven years Mortensens had
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established a prescriptive easement on the east curved portion of the road. Judge
Mitchell extinguished Mortensens' claim of a prescriptive easement on the east
curved portion of the road based on Akers' permission to use that part of the road
the day before Mortensens purchased the 160 acres from Peplinskis.
That Mortensens used the road frequently and openly for seven years is
supported by V.J. Mortensens and Dennis Akers' testimony. However Judge
Mitchell ruled that Mortensens' use of the road was infrequent.
Besides logging what other uses did Mr. Mortensen make of
the road during his ownership of the property?
Akers:
Urn, I have no idea. He ran a backhoe up there day and night
constantly making changes doing something. I don't know what
he did. It was none of my business so(Trial Transcript page 627, lines 19-25)
Reagan:

Judge Mitchell: Mr. Mortensen testified he never asked Akers for
permission to use any part of the road since he purchased in 1994, that he
never tried to hide his travel from plaintiffs, although the frequency of his
travel was rare.
(FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, Filed
1-2-03, paragraph # 4, page 20)
Judge Mitchell's many critical errors have been consistent throughout this
litigation. Had the interpretation of evidence been correct, the facts would have
been entirely different as would have been the conclusions.
-11-

C. Width ofEasement
Judge Mitchell found the easement was only 12.2 feet wide, yet the
testimonies of William A. Millsaps, (Tr., Vol. I, p.874,I1. 5-14) Richard Peplinski
(Tr., Vol.!, p. 7 7 6, Ll. 22-25, p. 77 7, n. 1 - I 6) and even Dennis Akers (Tr., Vol.
I, p. 984,11. 8-18) all concur that the original road was 25 feet wide or wider.
The 12.2 foot wide easement is the only basis that supports punitive damages for
trespass.
Judge Mitchell ignored the competent and substantial evidence of four
witnesses when determining that the access road was 12.2 feet wide. Not a single
witness testified to that width. Four witnesses testified the access road was 25
feet wide or wider. Those witnesses included Richard Peplinski, W.L. Millsaps in
the form of an affidavit, William A. Millsap, the son ofW.L. Millsaps and even
Dennis Akers. The only other witness to testify about the access road prior to
Akers' arrival was William Reynolds who didn't give an opinion regarding the
width. Instead he described the access as a two tire track trail but never mentioned
the amount of flat ground on each side of each track.
The 12.2 width of the road was determined by a survey by Scott Razor made
-12-

in 2002 well outside the critical time between 1966 and 1980 and showed a travel
path with flat ground on each side of that travel path.
W.L. MILLSAPS:

That roadway at said date served as ingress and
egress for farming equipment which consisted of
trucks and various types of field equipment such
as combines which have a width of twenty feet or
more. We contemplated that the width, although
expressed in the reservation of easement, was to
be at least thirty feet, so as to be able to handle the
equipment and also to allow for proper preparation
of the road surface and proper drainage with
respect thereto. This was under- stood by the
Grantees, Mr. and Mrs. Baker."
(See affidavit ofW.L. Millsaps.)
Judge Mitchell found that only one Millsaps testified and that he contradicted his
own testimony with his affidavit, but W.L. Millsaps who was deceased at the time
of trial testified by Affidavit while his son William A. Millsaps who was living at
the time of trial testified in person.
Judge Mitchell:

Defendants now argue the easement by prescription
should be 25 feet wide. (Defendants') Brief on Remand,
pp. 5-9. Defendants argue W. L. Millsap's testimony and
Richard Peplinski's testimony at trial supports this
conclusion. Id., pp,6-7. However, both Millsap and
Peplinski were not as credible as William Reynolds.
Millsap's trial testimony was contradicted by his
affidavit, as noted by this Court in its 2003 findings of
-13-

fact.
(See page 11, lines 4-8 of the trial court's Order on Remand filed 9-7-06)
The testimonies of William A. Millsaps, Richard Peplinski and even Dennis
Akers all concur with W.L. Millsaps affidavit that the road was 25 wide or wider.
William A. Millsaps testified as follows:
Q: I'm gonna show you Defendants' Exhibit 44, and, I'm gonna tell you that
this is a blow-up of an aerial map back from 1972. I'm gonna show you
Millsap Loop Road coming up, curving around. That would be the rest of
the loop, right?
A: Yeah.
Q; And then the access road into your property?
A: Yeah, that's it right there.
Q: Okay, does Defendants' Exhibit 44 accurately depict the road as it was in
say, summer of 1966?
A: Looks like it to me, yes.
Q: Okay. Does the width of the road depicted in that exhibit, that aerial
photograph look like about the width of the county road?
A: Looks like it to me.
Q: Is that your recollection of how the road was in 1966?
A: Yes it is.
Q: Okay, do you have any estimate for how wide the road surface was -let's just
say except this bog area that you maybe went around, about how wide was
the rest of the road that you used up until 1966?
A: Oh, I'd say twenty to thirty feet twenty-five feet, something like that
Q: It wasn't just two tracks?
-14-

A: No,
Q: Was it ever just two tracks in the dirt?
A: Not that I remember.
(Tr., Vol. I, p.874 ,11. 5-14)
Richard Peplinski confirmed Millsaps' testimony as follows:
Q: How wide was some of the equipment that you used this road for?
A: We had equipment as wide as 25 feet.
Q: Could you describe for us - - well, here, let me ask you this. Let's look
again at
D-44. 1realize that that blowup's a little bit fuzzy, but does that accurately
depict the relative width of your access road compared to what is depicted
in that photograph of Millsap Loop Road?
A: Looking at the picture and doing a comparison, yes.
Q: Is it fair to say that your private access road was nearly as wide as the
county road coming up to it?
A: Yes.
Q: When your dad purchased the property in 1967, was that road just two
tacks?
A: No.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 776, Ll. 22-25, p. 77 7, 11. 1 - I 6)
Dennis Akers also testified the road width should be 25 feet:
Q: Basically under that agreement with the Peplinskis in terms of what -was the road to be changed or stay the same as it was?
A: Well, that's basically what it was. It was to stay like it was which is 25
feet basically. That includes the ditches and edges.
Q: The ditches and the shoulder, the contour of the road?
A: Right, um-hmm.
Q: All of that 25 feet?
A: Right.
-15-

(Tr., Vol. I, p. 984,11. 8-18)
A 12.2' easement has to be found in order to impose damages and punitive
damages against defendants, since the conduct giving rise to punitives is trespass
outside the bounds of the easement.
Judge Mitchell:

Defendants argue at length that trespass damages, emotional
distress damages and punitive damages are not appropriate.
(Defendants') Brief on Remand, pp.9-41. Defendants' argument
is premised on their claim they have done nothing wrong if
they have a 25 foot wide easement by prior use or by
prescription. As stated above, this Court finds no easement by
necessity and the prescriptive easement is limited to 12.2 feet.
The Idaho Supreme Court wrote: "The question of whether and
to what degree the Defendants' conduct constituted trespass on
the Akers' property is intertwined with the scope and
boundaries of the Appellants' easement." 127 P.3d at 207. This
Court finds most of defendants' actions of trespass involved
activity outside the boundaries of this 12.2 foot easement.
(Page 13, lines 12-20, ORDER ON REMAN filed 9-7-06)

12.2 feet was determined ignoring the testimonies ofW.L. Millsaps, his son
William A. Millsaps, Richard Peplinski and Dennis Akers and relying on a survey
that did not represent a road but a travel path in a road and had nothing to do with
the appearance or location of the access road between 1966 and 1980.
On second appeal this Court found Richard Peplinski's testimony was a credible
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while referring to his testimony describing the access road crossing into section 24
and continuing west into Akers' property for about 120 feet before curving in the
shape of a Shepard's crook southerly into the 160 acres refuting Akers' claim that
the road turned south into Reynolds property before entering section 24.
D. Amount ofDamages
As to the amount of damages, we cite Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496
P.2d 682 (1972) modified by Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897,
904-905, 665 P.2d 661,668-669 (1983) and argue that no policy of deterrence is
furthered by the amount of the award since Marti Mortensen will not face
easement disputes in the future.
Judge Mitchell's errors are the reason for this long-drawn-out litigation.
Although Judge Mitchell states,
The irony is that had Mortensens and Whites brought litigation to have their
easement rights against Akers decided judicially, prior to their excavation
and intimidation, this could have ended peaceably almost a decade ago.
[Tf. 570 at 591 line 13] Defendants are not responsible for the Court's errors that
required three appeals and corrections by the Supreme Court.

3. Attorneys Fees
-17-

Marti Mortensen did not object to the amount of attorneys claimed, but
rather to the underlying decision to award them. AKERS entitlement to attorneys
fees flows from IRC 6-202 and applies only to those fees incurred to enforce the
trespass provisions of that statute. The fees must apportioned pursuant to
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (1993).

4. Punitive Damages Allocable to MARTI MORTENSEN
Respondents correctly assert that the issue is whether the conduct giving
rise to damages benefitted the community. [Respondent's brief at 21] But the state
of mind required to establish punitive damages, "malice" or "extreme
wrongfulness" Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc. 122 Idaho 47,830
P.2d 1185 (1991), quoting Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905,
665 P.2d 661, 669 (1983) should not be applied to an innocent spouse.
Community liability for spousal torts is based on agency principles, and
agency law does not necessarily impose punitive damages against a principal for
an agent's acts absent authorization or ratification. Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic
& Hospital, Inc. 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185 (1991). Thus while a spouse may

be engaged generally in an activity intended to benefit the community, as inHegg
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v. lR.S., 28 P.3d 1004, 136 Idaho 61 (2001), where he steps aside from that
activity to commit malicious acts, liability should not apply to a spouse absent
authorization or ratification.
AKERS argues that Marti Mortensen waived this issue by failing to raise it
in prior appeals.

A. This Issue was Within the Scope of Remand
Issues that are "subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court"
may be addressed on remand. Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass 'n, Inc. v.
Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 136 P.3d 332 (2006); State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11
P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000). Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175, 1183
(2009) included the issue of joint and several liability in its remand.
This issue was subsidiary for one simple reason: the Supreme Court
recognized that the whole issue of punitive damages could not be decided until the
exact limits of the easement were known. Therefore only after that decision was
made could punitive damages even be addressed. Once addressed, the question of
applicability to Marti Mortensen was appropriately before the court.

B. New Events
-19-

Mortensens were not divorced when the underlying events occurred. That
change of status is a critical event since Marti Mortensen had no reason to assert
separate liability at the time this suit began. This Court should recognize an
exception to permit a divorcing spouse to at lease revisit the issue when a case is
remanded on appeal, since there is no prejudice to the other party.
5. Change of Judge

White Construction's brief at 45 discusses Caps tar Radio Operating Co. v.
Lawrence, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _ (Slip Op. No. 38300, Supreme Court of Idaho

May 29, 2012). That case is strikingly similar to this one: same judge, same
appeals counsel (James, Vernon and Weeks), easement issues and a motion to
recuse. This court, just as it had in the original, withdrawn opinion in Akers v.
Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175 (2009), directed that a new judge hear

the case.
With all possible respect to Judge Mitchell and to this court, if a 10 year
history of litigation and 'bad blood' justifies a change of judge in that case, it
certainly does in this case. If nothing else, purely from an appearance of
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impropriety standpoint, this Court should follow White's argument and require a
change of judge.
Conclusion

This Court should follow the arguments by other appellants and remand this
matter to correct the error is the location of the easement before a new Judge.
Additionally this Court should find attorneys fees and punitive damages awarded
were excessive and inapplicable to Marti Mortensen.
October 24, 2012

Dus
s
Attorney for MARTI MORTENSEN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Dustin Deissner certifies:
I have on this date served the foregoing document upon the following
parties by the following means:
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